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Against Resultant Luck in the Legal System 
Blair MacDonald 
The legal system frequently holds people accountable for actions that are partially outside the control 
of the person in question. This essay will examine the particular case in which people are held 
accountable for the results of the action even though these results were not entirely within the 
person’s control (this is referred to as resultant luck). Some have argued that resultant luck should 
not be accepted by the legal system, and instead that people should only be held accountable only for 
aspects of the act which are within their control. There is however a problem in the literature of 
proposing an acceptable definition of “control”. It will be argued that a more compelling case can be 
made against the resultant luck if results are understood in terms of “moral skill” instead of simply 
“control”. Moral skill requires that the person in question is capable of recognizing the morally right 
action and the ability for the person to act on this knowledge. The essay will contend that resultant 
luck lacks the proper relation to moral skill and thus should not be incorporated into the legal system.    
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Moral luck occurs when a person is treated as the proper object of praise and blame, despite the 
fact that a significant portion of the act in question is beyond the person's control.1 Current legal 
systems accept moral luck, and consequently punish people despite the fact that they have been 
morally lucky or unlucky. There are many different kinds of moral luck, such as circumstantial luck, 
constitutive luck, casual luck, and resultant luck. This essay is concerned with resultant luck and 
whether the legal system should seek to eliminate it. As will be elaborated upon later, resultant luck 
pertains to the contingent consequences which follow an action. I will begin my discussion by 
presenting an overview of the debate and where the controversies lie. I will then proceed to analyze 
some arguments in the literature both for and against the acceptance of resultant luck in the legal 
system. I will argue that none of the arguments withstand careful scrutiny. I will then propose my 
own argument in which I will contend that the legal system should be revised to remove the role of 
resultant luck. 
 
 Despite controversy regarding resultant luck, there is some agreement that can be found 
between the opposing positions. Michael S. Moore (who argues in favour of resultant luck) and Larry 
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Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan (who argue against resultant luck) agree on some initial starting 
points on the issue. Importantly they all agree that resultant luck is really an issue regarding 
causation.2 It is a question of whether "the causation of harm increases moral blameworthiness”.3 
Some of the causal factors which contribute to harm appear to be partially outside the agent's 
control. For example someone could attempt a murder by firing a gun at moderate range. The 
success or failure of the murder will depend on factors such as if the gun was properly 
manufactured or not. These factors could cause the bullet not to fire, or could cause the gun to be 
so inaccurate that the murder fails. This raises the question of the moral relevancy of results – as the 
causation of these results is at least partially outside the agent’s control. Furthermore the authors 
agree that causation is neither necessary nor sufficient for responsibility. In the case of conduct 
crimes (such as drunk driving) the agent is culpable, even if no harm resulted. Consequently the 
causing of harm is not necessary for culpability. Furthermore they agree that causing of harm is not 
sufficient for culpability. However, it is necessary that one possess the requisite mens rea for a crime 
to have been committed (setting aside cases of strict liability in tort law). Rather the role of resultant 
luck is more complex, as it currently acts as an aggravating factor. Drunk driving is a culpable act 
subject to criminal penalties, but drunk driving causing death is an act subject to more severe 
penalties. Thus the causation of harm increases the punishment, typically by doubling the 
sentencing.4   
  
As a result, the debate centers on whether it is just to punish people more severely due to 
factors which can be categorized as involving resultant luck. Those in favour of accepting resultant 
luck advocate for a continuation of the current legal system with regards to the matter, as it does 
not make accommodations for resultant luck. Those against resultant luck seek to remedy the 
system by proposing that all crimes should be inchoate crimes.5 These "crimes of attempt, attempt-
like crimes with specific-intent, and crimes of risk creation".6 On this view one would be charged with 
attempted murder - even if one was successful in completing the murder. Likewise with acts that 
involve risk creation, such as drunk driving. The crime involved with drunk driving would not depend 
on facts of harm caused by the drunk driving (such as vehicular manslaughter), it would depend 
purely on the choice to engage in driving while intoxicated. Before presenting my own argument, I 
will present an overview of some arguments both for and against permitting resultant luck within 
the legal system.  
 
 In favour of the acceptance of resultant luck Moore proposes an experiential argument.7 He 
begins by stating that the first person perspective in privileged when considering ethical judgments. 
From this perspective he argues that people have different emotional responses after engaging in 
reckless behaviour which depends on the role of resultant luck. In the case where reckless 
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behaviour (distracted driving) results in no harm (fortunately swerving out of the way at the last 
moment to avoid a pedestrian) the person is likely to feel relief, and focus on improving themselves 
for next time. However in the case where a reckless act (such as distracted driving again) results in 
harm (such as the death of the pedestrian) the person is likely to be overcome with guilt and regret 
for the harm they caused the other person. Moore contends that the person will feel more guilty 
because they are in fact more guilty. His argument could be framed as follows: 
 
(1) In cases of actual harm (relative to cases where they are morally lucky and avoid the 
harm), the perpetrator experiences increased feelings of guilt  
  
(2) This increased feeling of guilt is evidence that the person is in fact more guilty 
 
(1) seems to be true based on general observations about human psychology. (2) makes the 
inference from psychological experience of guilt, to actual moral standing of guilt. It is important to 
recognize that the word “guilt” is ambiguous between actually being guilty of some act, and of some 
emotional feeling. Moore tries to go from one type of guilt to the other, but there is no necessary 
connection between them. Nonetheless this is just an accident of language that “guilt” is used in 
these two different senses – he requires this argument to be successful in order to connect these 
two senses. He concludes, on the basis of this argument, that there is a principled reason for 
believing that resultant luck should play a role in the judgment of a person's guilt. 
 
 Setting aside potential complexities regarding the privileging of the first person perspective, 
the argument may be subject to the following counter-argument (which is a modified version of 
Alexander’s and Ferzan’s response to Moore): the intuition that results matter is very important in 
some regards, just not with respect to judgments of moral blameworthiness.8 The general strategy 
of this argument takes this form: 
 
(1*) In cases of actual harm (relative to cases where they are morally lucky and avoid the 
harm), the perpetrator experiences increased feelings of guilt 
 
(2*) This increased feeling of guilt is evidence only that harm ought to be avoided (and 
consequently is not evidence for culpability) 
 
(1*) is in agreement with Moore’s psychological observation (1), which appears to be true. (2*) 
contends that the feeling of guilt is actually evidence for another conclusion, namely that harm 
ought to be prevented. It also contains the negation of Moore’s conclusion. The general 
argumentative strategy here is to take the same data as Moore, but to construct a rival conclusion 
on the basis of the same evidence. Alexander and Ferzan remark that “Criminal law… is about 
reducing harm because the occurrence of harm itself is not irrelevant to us. In some sense it is all 
that matters… The difference between murder and attempted murder is quite simply the difference 
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between death and life… it certainly matters whether actors succeed or fail”.9 People feel guiltier 
when harm actually occurs because harm is something which ought to be avoided. Harm simply 
matters – whether culpably caused or not. When people suffering due to a natural earthquake, this 
matters. The harm that these events cause is very important, even if there are no culpable actors. 
We experience sympathy for people who are harmed, and attempt to prevent future harms to them 
and to aid them in recovering. These emotions and feelings towards the victims of harm, however, 
do not necessarily entail anything about culpability. To illustrate this I will use an example from 
Alexander and Ferzan in which they consider a person who tries to rescue their friend from 
drowning.10 If the person fails to rescue their friend from drowning (perhaps they simply lacked the 
elite level of swimming skill needed to successfully pull off the rescue), they may feel overwhelmed 
with guilt over the event. They may look back on the event for years to come and regret the fact that 
they could not have done more (despite the fact that they could have done nothing more). Yet, I take 
it as obvious that no one would blame the person for letting their friend drown, despite these 
feelings of guilt and remorse. An extremely unfortunate outcome has occurred and the person has 
reacted with feelings of guilt, yet they are non-culpable. This case clearly illustrates that the 
experiential feeling of guilt does not entail any actual culpability. The person’s emotions reflect not 
his guilt, but the recognition of the negative effective of harms that resulted. Moore has attempted 
to link feelings of remorse to actual culpability. This explanation, however, is implausible in these 
cases. The person’s guilt is better explained by the fact that humans react with negative emotions to 
actual harm because harm is a bad thing to be avoided. Thus this example increases the plausibility 
of (2*) and illustrates its superiority to (2).  
 
 Furthermore, it is consistent to affirm the importance of harm, while denying its relevance to 
culpability, which can be understood within the P ∝ W X R framework.11 Just because harms are 
important to consider and ought to be avoided, does not have any straight-forwarded implications 
for culpability. It might be thought that if P ∝ W X R, and W = actual harm, then surely P is higher in 
cases of actual harm (i.e. accepting resultant luck). I however propose that P ∝ W X R can still be 
accepted without this implication. On this view W ≠ actual harm, but rather W = expected harm.12 In 
these terms, the person’s experience of guilt is not reflective of P, but of actual harm (which is not a 
part of the P ∝ W X R relation). Moore maintains the experience of guilt is evidence of actual 
culpability. I however, have contended on the basis of the thought-experiment that guilt provides 
evidence that harm is something that ought to be prevented, and is, in fact, poor evidence of actual 
culpability).  
 
 At this point Moore could probably propose another counter-example which may favour (2) 
instead of (2*). In response I could think up another example and a series of counter-examples 
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could take place. However it was never my intent for this argument to be my primary argument in 
favour of rejecting moral luck. Rather I was simply trying to create an equally plausible argument to 
act as a counter-weight against Moore’s proposal. If two equally plausible rival conclusions can be 
constructed on the basis of the same evidence, then belief ought to be withheld regarding the 
entailments of the evidence in question. Thus nullifying the effects of both arguments. I am content 
with this result because I intend to propose a stronger argument later in the paper on the basis of 
different evidence. For now it is sufficient for my purposes to cast doubt upon the opposing 
position’s argument. I will now examine the reasons in favour of the rejection of resultant luck. 
 
Moore contends that the usual argument for rejecting resultant luck takes the following 
form:13 
 
First premise: It is only fair to morally blame an agent for what is under that agent's control 
 
Second premise: People do not have control over the results of their actions 
 
Conclusion: Therefore people are not blameworthy for the results of their actions 
 
The first premise draws on the intuition that people are not morally blameworthy for things (e.g. the 
weather). The second premise draws on the intuition that results appear to be beyond the realm of 
control of individuals, as a gun may malfunction and change the results of a murder. On the basis of 
these premises the conclusion seems to validly follow.  
 
 Moore contends that the argument rests on an equivocation on the word "control".14 He 
argues that the first premise is true only on a compatibilist reading of control, and the second 
premise is only true on an incompatibilist reading of control. Thus leading to no consistent way of 
reading the argument in which it is valid. Let us begin by analyzing an incompatibilist reading of the 
argument. This sense of control is very strong, requiring the ability to do otherwise in a deep sense. 
This deep sense requires that the agent could have acted otherwise given the antecedent conditions. 
First of all, this means that the agent has the ability to do so – where ability is understood to rule out 
the possibility that indeterminacy could be responsible for the change in action. Secondly, it 
maintains that even if antecedent conditions are held identical, the person could have done 
otherwise. This is a denial of determinism. Thus it is not surprising on this very strong reading of 
control it is certainly true that people do not have control over the results of their actions, rendering 
premise two true. However Moore rejects the first premise on this reading.15 His worry can be 
framed roughly as: 
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(1) Assumption for Reductio: It is only fair to morally blame an agent's control for what is 
under an agent’s control (in the incompatibilist sense)  
 
(2) In the incompatibilist sense nothing is under an agent's control (i.e. determinism is true) 
 
 (3) It follows that agents are not blameworthy for any actions 
 
 (4) This is an unacceptable conclusion (i.e. agents are blameworthy at least  
sometimes) 
 
 (5) Therefore (1) is false 
 
The justification for (2) relies on the fact that because of factors such as constitutive luck and 
circumstantial luck, this type of freedom is simply not possible. (4) does not require a justification, it 
is essentially a denial a hard determinism. Moore's opponent (the anti-luck proponent) is clearly 
trying to draw a less extreme conclusion than this, and would thus would accept this premise. While 
(2) is undoubtedly controversial, Moore notes that the truth of it will likely just collapse into the free-
will debate.16 Requiring a proof of libertarianism strikes me as a strong mark against any attempt at 
an argument in favour of massive legal reform. For this reason I agree with Moore's dismissal of this 
reading, and instead turn to a weaker compatibilist reading - as it is less controversial.  
 
 On this reading Moore contends that while premise one may be true (it is only fair to blame 
an agent for what is under their control), premise two is now supposedly false (namely that people 
do not have control over the results of their actions). He contends what will be required is a 
principled difference between choices and results that will rest on a compatibilist notion of control.17 
Alexander and Ferzan attempt to provide just such an account. They argue that choices are reason-
responsive (and thus within an agent's control) and that results are not reason-responsive (and thus 
not under an agent's control).18 This emerges from a discussion in which they attempt to separate 
resultant luck from other types of luck (such as constitutive luck). They argue that what is relevant is 
that choices, while they may be the result of constitutive luck, are reason-responsive, and this is 
what accounts for their being within the control of an agent.19 Moore consents to this and agrees 
that choices and actions are within an agent's control. However he disagrees that results are not 
reason-responsive.20 Consider someone who is plotting the murder of their rival at work. They break 
into the person's house and proceed to locate their rival and shoot them multiple times, causing 
their death. Moore agrees that the decision to murder them was indeed reason-responsive, but 
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contends that the resulting death was likewise reason-responsive.21 He contends that surely if the 
person did not have reasons to kill the rival, then the rival would not have died. He concludes that 
the result was indeed reason-responsive.22 He clearly has in mind some sort of counterfactual 
understanding of reasons responsive where it means roughly that "If the reasons had been different, 
then X would not have occurred", where X is some event - whether it be a choice or a result. For the 
purposes of argument, I will grant this point to Moore. 
 
 Moore anticipates some objections to his argument and prepares some responses. First he 
considers the objection that the reason-responsiveness needs to be direct.23 He questions whether 
many choices are even direct. He considers the person who needs to drink alcohol before he can 
muster the courage to make some future choice. This future choice is indirectly caused by his earlier 
drinking, and he contends it fails to meet the direct cause criteria. Furthermore he contends that 
such a strong notion of control will lead to the conclusion that we do not even control any non-
mental activity, such as undertaking a bodily movement. 24  Consequently he dismisses this 
understanding of control. 
 
 Moore then considers the suggestion that what separates the control of choice from the lack 
of control is the degree of control present.25 He contends that this distinction will fail because there 
is no significant difference in the degrees. He states that the amount of contingency in a result is 
often overemphasized. In choosing to fire a gun at someone the person has a very significant 
amount of control over their death. Likewise he contends that while some choices have a high 
probability, some choices have a low probability.26 This is supposedly because given the type of 
character that a person has a certain choice may be low probability for them (perhaps because of 
their malicious nature they are unlikely to give to charity). He concludes that choices and results 
both vary widely in the degree of control the agent has over them.  
 
 His first response that control does not require direct causation, seems fairly plausible. Since 
bodily movements are indirect (as they have intermediary factors such as neurons transferring 
neural impulses), it is far-fetched to think these movements are not under our control. If this was the 
case then it is hard to see how people could even be held responsible for attempts. An attempt to 
murder is going to require taking actions in preparation, however if these actions are under the 
person's control (as they would not be under this strict definition), then it appears they might not be 
able to be even held responsible for the attempt. This is an unrealistically restrictive sense of control. 
Consequently this response seems well founded. 
 
 However, his second remark about the degrees of control is a bit more problematic. He 
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maintains that some choices are low probability in light of the characteristics of the person in 
question. Even if this is true it seems to miss the mark a bit. The concern is not with the probability 
that one will make a certain choice, but rather with the degree of control the agent has with respect 
to making that choice. Perhaps the person was feeling uncharacteristically malicious one day and 
makes the decision to assault someone. The choice was low probability with respect to the stable 
character traits the person has, but they still seemed to possess a high degree of control with 
respect to the choice. However there are other reasons that Moore does not discuss which could 
justify his response. For the control of choices actually varies widely depending on a variety of 
factors. Consider someone who is angered very easily and loses his ability to think straight when 
enraged. Such a person has diminished control over their choices. Likewise a person with an 
addiction to some substance may have substantially diminished control over their choices with 
regards to the substance. This is sufficient for Moore’s point that there is no bright line distinction 
between results and choices in terms of degrees of control. Some choices allow a person relatively 
high degrees of control (such stabbing a defenseless sleeping person) and some choices allow a 
person for relatively less control (such as getting into a fight while lacking complete volitional 
control). 
 
 Moore’s main point throughout his objections is that "[c]ontrol does not distinguish choices 
from results".27 Any proposal to eliminate resultant luck from the legal system requires a principled 
way to distinguish between choices and results, and furthermore this proposal needs to 
demonstrate that this distinction is morally relevant. Moore gives good reason to think that control 
is not the right property to motivate this distinction. While it prima facie may look promising, it falls 
to his scrutiny.  
 
 I will attempt to modify the control argument in such a way that it maintains its general form, 
while changing some details so that it is not susceptible to Moore’s criticisms. However I would like 
to first discuss the inspiration for my argument which originates in decision and game theory. In “An 
Introduction to Decision Theory”, Martin Peterson discusses the distinction between rational 
decisions and right decisions. “[W]e say that a decision is right if and only if its actual outcome is at 
least as good as that of every other possible outcome. Furthermore, we say that a decision is 
rational if and only if the decision maker chooses to do what she has most reason to do at the point 
in time at which the decision is made”.28 Right decisions are judged in hindsight, based on how the 
world happened to turn out, whereas rational decisions are judged from the perspective of the 
agent at the time. Decision and game theory focuses on rationality “because theories of rationality 
operate on information available at the point in time the decision is made, rather than on 
information available at some later point in time”.29  
 
 An example of this distinction is apparent when considering a Texas Hold ’em player who is 
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dealt a 2 and a 7 (off-suit). This is the worst possible starting hand in terms of probability of winning 
given the information at the time. Imagine such a player going all-in after receiving such a hand (and 
full well knowing that that it is a poor hand). Furthermore assume he is the first to bet, and 
consequently he had no insight into other player’s hands as they did not have the opportunity to bet 
or check (and thus attempting to “buy the pot” at this stage would be an erroneous decision). As it so 
happens a few people at the table go all in, and against all odds our lucky protagonist manages to 
win the hand. From the perspective of decision and game theory this person has behaved 
irrationally and is not deserving of praise. The results were not a display of skill, but were rather the 
result of luck. 
 
 I propose that similar line of reasoning should be adopted with regards with resultant luck 
within the legal context. I propose the following argument:  
 
 First premise: Choices reflect the moral skills of agents 
 
 Second premise: Results do not capture the moral skills of agents 
  
 Third premise: Our practices of moral praise and blame should reflect the  
moral skills that the agent displayed 
 
 Conclusion: Therefore results are not relevant to the practice of blaming 
 
This argument takes a similar form to the ‘control’ argument proposed earlier, however it is now cast 
in terms of an agent’s moral skill (perhaps moral skill is a specific form of control, or perhaps not, 
either way it should not have any impact on the soundness of my argument). This is a somewhat 
odd terminology choice, but I believe it will help illuminate the issue more clearly. What exactly does 
it take to have moral skill? Before answering this question I want to arrive at a more general account 
of skill by looking at skill in different domains. I will select examples that are structurally similar to 
moral scenarios. Sports (such as baseball) make for closer analogies because they have an element 
of luck when it comes to results. This is not so clear in competitions like chess, where (at least at the 
high level) there is much less luck involved when determining results. My examples will attempt to 
keep the analogy as close as possible. 
 
 In American baseball the field sizes differ from stadium to stadium. The smallest field size 
(measured in distance to center field) is Angel Stadium at 121m and the largest is Minute Maid 
Stadium at 133m. This distance in part determines how hard it is to hit the ball out in center field. 
Consider two batters who are playing, one in each stadium (the batters are unaware which stadium 
they are playing in, and cannot adapt accordingly). The first batter hits the ball towards center field: 
122m deep, 125m deep, and 128m deep. The second batter hits the ball towards center field: 129m 
deep, 131m deep, and 135m deep.  Assuming that if the ball was hit beyond distance to center field, 
then the player scored a home-run, then which player had the better results that game based on 
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these hits? Well that information entirely depends on what field they were in. If the second batter 
(who consistently hit further) was in Minute Maid Stadium he would have scored zero home-runs, 
whereas the first batter would have scored three home-runs if he were in Angel Stadium. Yet on the 
basis of this evidence (and the assumption that there were no other luck factors at play i.e. their hits 
were reflective of their batting knowledge and their physical capabilities) the second batter still has 
more skill. Being good at baseball does not mean getting the most points, there are other measures 
of performance which are more important.  
 
 Consider another example from curling. Suppose that a team arrives for an event and do not 
have time to examine the rink, yet they have no reason to expect any abnormalities. The lead is an 
expert player in the game and begins to throw the first stone. The stone is delivered in such a way 
that if the ice was formed in a normal manner, it would result in a perfectly placed first shot. 
Unfortunately the ice is warped in a slightly strange way (the deformation is only in a very specific 
spot, and would only matter when hit at a certain angle). It just so happens that the rock hits the 
deformation and results in a poor position. The opponents take their throw and then the stage is set 
for the lead to be given another chance (they manage to avoid any abnormal ice patterns). The lead 
incorporates the knowledge of the ice deformation and plans to shoot around it. He once again 
know the exact shot to capitalize given the situation in the game. However, as luck would have it, he 
hits upon another very similar deformation once again disrupting the shot and resulting in a sub-
optimal position. The results (sub-optimal shots) are not reflective of the curler’s skill. Yet he is still 
praiseworthy for these shots, as they were reflective of his ability to play the game at an elite level. 
Given the knowledge that he had, he chose the right way to shoot and correctly acted upon it. The 
poor results of those two shots do not affect the fact that the lead displayed good curling skill in his 
shots, and is praiseworthy as a result.  
 
 Results may have some correlation with skill, but are not sufficient nor necessary nor do 
they enhance the achievement. One can lose out to luck and still display their wonderful skill while 
doing so. This is true in decision and game theory (as showcased in the poker example), and in the 
sports examples. 
 
 To proceed any further it will be necessary to define what constitutes moral skill. I will by 
establishing a more general account of skill. I propose that there are two components to being 
skilled in some activity: (1) the ability to identify an optimal choice given the information available at 
the time, and (2) the ability to act on that choice. The first component is cognitive and involves 
recognizing analyzing the situation to determine an optimal choices. In the poker case, the player 
must recognize that their hand has a low probability of winning given the circumstances at hand, 
and that going all in is likely to have the lowest expected payoff. Likewise since the second batter 
used his extensive knowledge of batting to hit the ball the far distance, he too displayed the 
cognitive component of requiring skill. Similarly with the expert curler. The “given the information 
available at the time” part of the condition is meant to rule out factors that the person could not 
reasonably foresee (such as what cards the dealer is about to play on the flop, surely those factors 
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should be excluded from judgments of skill). I also say “an optimal choice” as opposed to “the 
optimal choice” to lower the standard for skill. It is unreasonable to contend that someone who 
chooses the second best technique given the circumstances has not displayed skill. One does not 
need to make the most optimal choice at the time, it just needs to be an optimal choice (and 
consequently comes in degrees). The second component depends upon the ability to act upon the 
optimal choice. In poker this might depend upon having the correct body language as to hide a bluff. 
In baseball and curling it is physically difficult to exercise the optimal choice sometimes. It requires 
proper training in terms of strength, and also in terms of developing the correct muscle memory. 
This is necessary because someone who cannot hit the ball far enough in baseball, or cannot throw 
at the correct angle (despite having the knowledge of what the correct throw would be), is not 
displaying skill in that area. In some areas of life one component of skill may be much more difficult 
to satisfy than the other. For example, being skilled in lifting a large amount of weight requires 
minimal cognitive ability, but may be very difficult to act upon. Contrast this with chess, where it is 
very easy to physically act and move the pieces, but is very cognitively demanding. I propose that 
this definition of skill is very plausible given its huge degree of explanatory power. 
 
 With skill already defined, it becomes easier to define what is meant by “moral skill”. Moral 
skill requires: (1) the ability to identify a morally optimal choice given the information available at the 
time and, (2) the ability to act on that choice. The first requirement involves the cognitive ability to 
assess the situation and determine what a right thing to do would be. Someone might fail to be 
morally skilled because they fail to consider the suffering they might inflict by choosing to undergo 
some course of action (such as deciding to drive home drunk). A person may also fail to be morally 
skilled because they lack the moral strength to act on the right choice. For example someone might 
see the wrong they are going to commit and acknowledge a morally better choice (thus satisfying 
the cognitive component), but for selfish reasons to decide act on the wrong choice. I contend that 
since the general account of skill was plausible, so too is this specific instance of it.  
 
 With this definition established, I now present my first two premises again:  
Choices reflect the moral skill of an agent, and results do not reflect the moral skill of an agent. In 
these other areas of life regarding skill, choices and acts capture skill in ways that results do not. 
Results may be correlated with skill sometimes, but results are not the true measure of skill. Given 
the definition of skill, this is true. Results often depend upon factors that cannot be considered at 
the time of the decision, as that information is not available to the agent at the time. There is no 
reason to think that this does not ring true for morality any differently than in these other similar 
areas of life that involve luck with regards to results. When someone attempts to murder someone 
else via gunshot, given the information they have at the time it may be almost certain that the 
murder will be a success. However, as the agent could not have known, the gun fails to fire, thus 
preventing the murder. This however has no bearing the moral skill of the person. They still 
identified a wrong choice, and proceeded to act upon it. This establishes a principled difference 
between choices and results.  
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 I further contend that it is essential to recognize this distinction for our practices for praise 
and blame. I once again draw on earlier analogies to justify this point. No one is praising the person 
who makes an extremely risky and irrational bet and happens to win. If anything they will probably 
deem him an idiot who simply got lucky. Likewise in sports, just because a player’s results (whether 
in losing the game, or perhaps in their measure of points (the baseball example)) are not as 
important as their choices and actions. I contend this is true for morality as well. The crazy driver 
who just happens to narrowly miss killing several people each month deserves a substantive 
amount of blame, the same amount of blame as if he had killed one or more people. I contend that 
a principled and relevant distinction exists between choice and results, and it is grounded in the 
difference of moral skill corresponding to these categories.  
 
On this account, crimes ought to be cast in terms of attempts and reckless behaviour. Those 
are reflective of the moral skill in of an agent in a way that many current crime laws do not. From the 
perspective of P ∝ W X R, the component W is equal to the lack of moral skill displayed in an act. 
Acts such as attempted murder are more reprehensible than acts of theft because they display a 
greater lack of moral skill. Either because the person fails to recognize the possible harms inflicted 
by the act, or because they fail to act on what they know to be an optimal choice.   
 
 A vulnerability of some attempts to eliminate resultant luck can face that charge that there is 
no principled distinction between resultant luck and constitutive or circumstantial luck. For example, 
it could be argued that constitutive/circumstantial luck undermine control just as much as resultant 
luck. However this charge will not be successful against my account. It may be true that 
circumstances and a person’s luck in having their constitution explain why a person is morally skilled, 
but this hardly undermines their skill. Imagine someone stating that “LeBron isn’t skilled, he just had 
the right characteristics and circumstances to grow up in to become a great basketball player”. This 
is preposterous. It does not matter how someone acquires skill, only that they have it. The only luck 
that interferes with measures of this skill is resultant luck, and that is why I propose that it is 
eliminated. Decision and game theory take a similar approach, and legal practice should follow suit. 
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